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ABSTRACT
The Incentives of Employers’ Associations to Raise Rivals’ Costs in the Presence of
Collective Bargaining
by Justus Haucap, Uwe Pauly and Christian Wey
This paper explores the role that employers’ associations may play in centralized wage
bargaining processes. It thereby adds to the literature on labor markets, in which the
relationship between union behavior and unemployment has been explored quite
extensively, while employers’ associations have been almost escaped economic analysis
so far. The paper shows that employers’ associations may possibly foster a wage increase
due to their potential incentives to raise rivals’ costs. In a simple model, it is shown that
employers’ associations can use standard wages as a barrier to entry to product markets
if producers differ in labor productivity. We identify conditions, under which unions will
prefer entry deterring standard wages compared to a system of competitive wage
determination, and the paper shows that there may be cases in which a centralized union
acting in a wage revenue maximizing manner may actually prevent minimum wages from
raising above certain levels. Depending on the exact parameter values unions may then
offset the adverse effects employers’ federations can have on the industry’s employment
rate. Starting from our formal model we argue that minimum wage legislation might
actually be favored by employers’ federations. Furthermore, we show that the German
labor law provides for a mechanism to set minimum wages by the industry itself: Wage
agreements between unions and employers’ associations can be made legally binding for
the entire industry through a so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung. As a final
example we analyze the incentives the West German employers’ association had to
implement high wages in Eastern Germany in order to avoid competition from labor-
inefficient, but low-wage East German firms.
                                               
 We would like to thank Maria Arbatskaya, George von Furstenberg, Nils Gottfries, Paul
Heidhues, Johan Lagerlöf, Christian Molitor, Bernhard Nagel, Rudolf Richter, and Christine
Zulehner for helpful comments and discussions. Valuable suggestions also were made by
participants in the meetings of the German Association for Political Economy at Maastricht, the
European Public Choice Society at Gothenburg, the European Economic Association at Berlin,
the European Law and Economics Association at Utrecht, and at seminars at the University of
Saarland and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Of course, the usual
disclaimer applies. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ views and should not be
taken as representing the views of their institutions.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Anreize von Arbeitgeberverbänden zur strategischen Kostenerhöhung bei
kollektiven Lohnverhandlungen
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Rolle von Arbeitgeberverbänden in zentralisierten
Lohnverhandlungen. Der Beitrag ergänzt die existierende Literatur über Arbeitsmärkte,
in der zwar die Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaftsverhalten und Arbeitslosigkeit
ausgiebig analysiert werden, die Rolle der Arbeitgeberverbände jedoch fast durchweg im
verborgenen bleibt. Die Arbeit zeigt, daß Arbeitgeberverbände unter Umständen bestrebt
sind, Lohnerhöhungen durchzusetzen, um die Lohnkosten von nicht-organisierten
Konkurrenzunternehmen überproportional zu erhöhen. In einem einfachen Modell wird
bewiesen, daß ein Arbeitgeberverband Anreize hat, allgemein verbindliche Löhne als ein
Instrument zur Errichtung von Markteintrittsbarrieren zu benutzen, wenn die nicht-
organisierten Unternehmen eine niedrigere Arbeitsproduktivität aufweisen. Des weiteren
wird die Rolle einer Gewerkschaft untersucht, die die Lohnsumme ihrer Mitglieder
maximiert. Es werden die Parameterkonstellationen spezifiziert, so daß die Gewerkschaft
einen Lohn präferiert, der unter dem marktzutrittsverhindernden Lohn liegt, den der
Arbeitgeberverband durchsetzen möchte. Auf der Grundlage des Modells argumentieren
wir, daß Arbeitgeberorganisationen unter Umständen für die Implementierung von
Minimallöhnen eintreten. Als weitere Anwendungen des Modells diskutieren wir die
Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE) von Tarifvereinbarungen in Deutschland und die
Bereitschaft der westdeutschen Arbeitgeberverbände nach der Wiedervereinigung
Deutschlands, die rasche Angleichung des ostdeutschen Lohnniveaus an das
Westdeutschlands zu befürworten.
\[...] in 1990 I still thought that West German ¯rms would
help East German ¯rms to become competitive. Many of
those (West German) ¯rms' only interest was, however, to
eliminate competition." Former German Chancellor Hel-
mut Kohl in a newspaper interview for \Die Zeit", August
27, 1998, No. 36 (translated by the authors).
1 Introduction
In Germany wage bargaining occurs mainly at both, the national and the secto-
rial level.1 One core institution of the German system of collective bargaining is
the so-called \Tarifautonomie," which empowers unions, employers and employ-
ers' associations to bargain collectively.2 Although only unions, employers and
employers' associations that are involved as bargaining parties are bound by the
contract (x3 I TVG) the coverage of the agreement goes way beyond the bar-
gaining parties themselves. In particular, according to Article 5 TVG collective
wage settlements can be made generally binding for the entire industry by the
so-called \AllgemeinverbindlichkeitserklÄarung" (AVE).
This paper develops a theoretical model to examine the e®ects of the AVE in-
stitution within the German system of bilateral wage bargaining, where wages
are determined by an industry-wide union bargaining with a single employers'
association. The paper is concerned with the anticompetitive e®ects of generally
binding wage rates when incumbent ¯rms face potential entrants that are ready
to enter the market in an oligopolistic industry. The paper illustrates now the
incentives of employers' association to use the AVE as a means to raise rivals'
costs, and thereby, to deter entry of potential entrants. Within the model we also
examine the role a union plays in this setting. Depending on the exact parameter
values, bilateral wage bargaining might either lead to standard wage agreements
that even exceed the entry deterring level or might induce more e±cient wage
1For a cross-country comparison of the degree of centralization see Layard et al. 1991.
2The legal grounds for the \Tarifautonomie" can be found in Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the
Grundgesetz (GG) and the Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG).
agreements.
As a topical example, which nicely illustrates the incentives of employers' asso-
ciations to raise rivals' costs through collective wage agreements, consider wage
bargaining in East Germany after reuni¯cation. Clearly, East German ¯rms had
relatively low productivity levels compared to West German ¯rms. However, by
March 1991 the collective bargaining agreement in the metal producing industry
speci¯ed that wages would be equal for East and West German by April 1994.
This and other wage settlements have been so high that many East German ¯rms
had to shut down.
In their well-known study about the German reuni¯cation Sinn/Sinn 1992 argued
that West German employers' associations had no interest in keeping East Ger-
man wages low, because this would have devalued the existing capital stock in
West Germany. According to Sinn/Sinn 1992 low wages would have enabled East
German ¯rms to compete, and thereby reduce pro¯ts of West German ¯rms.
While the employers' associations' representatives paid lip service for the neces-
sity of low wages, union leaders praised them for their \cooperative behavior"
during negotiations (Sinn/Sinn 1992).
Yet, despite the intuitive plausibility of anticompetitive abuse of the AVE and
the obvious interests of incumbent ¯rms to erect barriers to entry, those e®ects
have not been incorporated explicitly into the theoretical literature dealing with
labor market institutions.3 Even political-economy based studies of labor market
institutions tend to neglect employers' associations. While Saint-Paul (1996a,
1996b) focuses on labor market institutions such as employment protection laws,
collective bargaining and minimum wages, the role of employers' associations is
3It is also surprising that the numerous theories explaining unemployment (see Bean 1994
and Richter 1997 for surveys) do not consider the role of employers' associations. While the
relationship between union behavior and unemployment has been explored quite extensively,
employers' associations have hardly been subject to analysis so far. In this context it is also
interesting to note that the \Handbook of Labor Economics" (see Ashenfelter/Layard 1986)
does not even mention the term \employers' association".
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almost completely neglected.
The present paper tries to take ¯rst steps to close this gap. Similar to insider-
outsider theories of unemployment (see Lindbeck/Snower 1988, Romer 1996) we
stress the idea that interest groups and social relations play a signi¯cant role
in labor markets. Coherent with theories of monopolistic union behavior (see
McDonald/Solow 1981) we assume that the labor market is not perfectly compe-
titive, but that market participants have some degree of market power. However,
in contrast to much of the existing literature the focus of our paper is not only
on union behavior, but also on the incentives employers' associations face in the
wage setting process. While theories of monopolistic union behavior usually as-
sume that it is the unions that have some monopoly power, we emphasize the
monopoly power of employers' associations. Contrary to conventional wisdom
we now claim that employers' associations eventually have incentives to increase
wages above the market-clearing level, when wages are generally binding for all
active ¯rms in the industry that is covered by the wage agreement.
The idea that ¯rms might put up with cost increases to raise rivals' costs was
¯rst developed by Williamson (1963, 1968). While in the ¯rst paper Williamson
1963 examined the role of advertising expenses as a barrier to entry, in the latter
Williamson explicitly focused on the use of uniform wage rates to induce labor
intensive ¯rms to exit a particular industry. More speci¯cally, Williamson analy-
zed the Pennington case -an industrywide wage contract that raised the costs of
relative labor-intensive competitors to a larger extent than the costs of relative
capital-intensive ¯rms. In his analysis Williamson uses a standard limit pricing
model of the Bain-Sylos-Labini type. According to Williamson's analysis larger
¯rms can operate at a more e±cient scale and set limit prices which prevent entry
into the industry.
Potential entrants are assumed to take the ex ante behavior of incumbent ¯rms as
given for the ex post situation when entry has occurred - an assumption that has
been correctly criticized by Selten (1965, 1975). Not only are oligopolistic inter-
3
actions between ¯rms neglected by Williamson 1968, but the behavior of unions
-or workers in general- is also not subject to Williamson's analysis. Williamson
1968, 91 rather assumes that \an agreement exists between the principal large
scale ¯rms in the industry and the union to impose a uniform wage on all ¯rms
in the industry independent of ability to pay." In contrast, the present paper
will also analyze the union's incentives to comply with high, non market-clearing
wages and introduce oligopolistic interactions into Williamson's basic analysis.4
In this respect, the paper is related to recent work by Michaelis 1994 who shows
that ¯rms which have relatively low costs of avoiding pollution might lobby for
tight environmental standards to raise rivals' costs.
Our analysis of employers' associations also touches the labor market literature
on the degree of wage bargaining centralization and its implications on macroe-
conomic variables (see, e.g., Calmfors/Dri±ll 1988, Freeman 1988, and Jackman
et al. 1990). As Petrakis/Vlassis 1997 show, centralized bargaining might lead to
wages above the market-clearing level.
Finally, our paper is also related to the analysis of Maloney et al. 1979 and
Maloney/McCormick 1982. The former work focuses on strikes and the latter
on certain quality standards as a means to restrict industry output and to raise
prices above the competitive level. However, in Maloney et al. 1979 the number
of ¯rms is exogenously given, i.e., there are no potential entrants. Moreover,
while Maloney et al. directly focus on quantity restrictions, we will analyze labor
market institutions that raise costs, and thereby preventing ¯rms from entering
the market and keeping prices high that way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop our mo-
del. To illustrate our model, Section 3 discusses German labor market institutions
which are designed to extend settlements either by a legal instrument (Allgemein-
4Williamson's idea that ¯rms might put up with higher costs if they can raise rivals' costs
to a larger degree has been picked up before by Salop/Sche®man (1983, 1987) and Krattenma-
ker/Salop 1986.
4
verbindlicherklÄarung) (Section 3.2) or by the German system of Pilot agreements
(Section 3.3 and 3.4). Section 4 shows that wage settlements in Eastern Germany
after reuni¯cation can be explained by our model. Finally, Section 5 gives some
policy implications and concludes.
2 The Model
The model is kept as simple as possible in order to isolate the impact of the AVE
within the German system of bilateral wage bargaining, which is characterized
by two main features: First, the main negotiations occur at industry level, and
second, there exists one central employers' association and one central union con-
federation which jointly determine the industrywide standard wage.5 Therefore,
we consider an industry with one union and one employers' association.
The model consists of a simple two-stage game. In the ¯rst stage of the game
wages are set on the labor market. Then, in the second stage ¯rms compete in
Cournot fashion on the product market. Concerning the wage setting process,
we will analyze two di®erent regimes of wage determination.
1. Monopolistic Employers' Association (ME): The employers' association sets
the generally binding standard wage in the ¯rst stage of the game without
facing a union. At the second stage all ¯rms take the standard wage as
given and determine their output levels.
2. Bilateral Monopoly (BM): One union and one employers' association bargain
about the standard wage. We assume that in the ¯rst stage the employers'
association proposes a take-it or leave-it o®er which the union can either
accept or reject. If the union decides to accept the wage proposal of the
5For a comparison of national wage bargaining systems see Bunn 1984 and Calmfors/Dri±ll
1988. In addition, see Berghahn/Karsten 1987 for a description of the historical roots and the
organizational structure of the German employers' associations.
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employers' association, this wage becomes the generally binding standard
wage. If, however, the union rejects the o®er, we assume the bargaining
process ends and market clearing wages prevail as the industry's uniform
wage. In the second stage, all ¯rms take the standard wage as given and
determine their output levels on the product market.
The ¯rst regime (ME) serves as a hypothetical benchmark case, to illustrate the
incentives of an employers' association to raise rivals' costs by increasing standard
wages. The second regime (BM) introduces an industrywide union which puts a
restriction on the wage proposals the employers' association can push through.
Hence, this regime examines the union's role in a setting where the employers'
association has incentives for adopting a raising rivals' costs strategy.
Throughout our analysis we assume the wage rate is the only variable determined
in the ¯rst stage of the game. This means, we restrict our analysis to right-to-
manage bargaining, so that each individual ¯rm retains its own management right
over the level of employment.6
We now solve the game by backward induction. In Section 2.1 we calculate the
noncooperative optimal strategies in the second stage of the game. In Section 2.2
we look at the optimal wage o®ers under the monopolistic employers' association
regime and the bilateral monopoly regime, given the optimal strategies in the
second stage of the game.
2.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium: Cournot Oligopoly
Suppose that there are N Cournot competitors in some particular industry pro-
ducing a homogeneous product. Quantity will be denoted by q, price by p. We
6In contrast to the right-to-manage model (see for example Nickell/Andrews 1983), the
e±cient bargaining model stipulates that the unions and the ¯rms bargain over wages and
¯rms' employment levels. For arguments in favor of the right-to-manage model see Layard et
al. 1991.
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suppose that labor is the only variable input factor, and that the production
function is linear in labor.7 Moreover, let us assume that there are two types
of ¯rms characterized by their production costs: Type-H ¯rms with constant
marginal cost of cH = ®Hw and type-L ¯rms with constant marginal cost of
cL = ®Lw, where w denotes the uniform standard wage for the entire industry.
Type-H ¯rms use labor less e±ciently than type-L ¯rms, so that the ratio of labor
input to output is higher for type-H ¯rms, i.e. ®H > ®L. Hence, it follows that
cH > cL. Type-L ¯rms are now indexed by i = (1; . . . ; k) and type-H ¯rms by
j = (k+1; . . . ; N ). The number of type-L ¯rms is k, while the number of type-H
¯rms is n with k + n = N .
Let us denote aggregate output by Q, and assume that the linear inverse demand
schedule is given by p = a ¡ bQ, with a; b > 0 and a
b
> Q ¸ 0. The aggregate
output, Q, consists of the sum over all quantities produced by type-L ¯rms,
QL ´
Pk
i=1 qi, and the aggregate output of type-H ¯rms, QH ´
PN
j=k+1 qj; i.e.,
Q = QL + QH . Suppose ¯rm t is of type L, then its maximization problem is
given by
max
qt
¦t =
Ã
a¡ b
kX
i=1
qi ¡ b
NX
j=k+1
qj ¡ cL
!
qt; for t = 1; . . . ; k: (1)
Solving for the ¯rst-order condition, one obtains ¯rm t's reaction function
qt(Q¡t) =
1
2b
Ã
a¡ b
kX
i=1;i 6=t
qi ¡ b
NX
j=k+1
qj ¡ cL
!
; (2)
for t = 1; . . . ; k, where Q¡t denotes the sum of quantities chosen by ¯rm t's
competitors. Similarly, if ¯rm t is of type H the maximization problem becomes
max
qt
¦t =
Ã
a¡ b
kX
i=1
qi ¡ b
NX
j=k+1
qj ¡ cH
!
qt; (3)
for t = k + 1; . . . ; N . Firm t's reaction function is now given by
qt(Q¡t) =
1
2b
Ã
a¡ b
kX
i=1
qi ¡ b
NX
j=k+1;j 6=t
qj ¡ cH
!
; (4)
7As an implication of this assumption there is no optimal scale and production is determined
by product market restrictions.
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for t = k + 1; . . . ; N . Solving (2) and (4) for qt, we obtain the unique (and type-
symmetric) Cournot-Nash equilibrium which is characterized by the following
quantities for type-L ¯rms, qL, and type-H ¯rms, qH :
8
qL =
a¡ cL + n(cH ¡ cL)
b(k + n + 1)
=
a+ w(n®H ¡ ®L(n+ 1))
b(k + n+ 1)
; (5)
qH =
a¡ cH ¡ k(cH ¡ cL)
b(k + n+ 1)
=
a¡ w(®H(k + 1)¡ k®L)
b(k + n+ 1)
: (6)
Industry output is
Q = kqL + nqH =
Na¡ ncH ¡ kcL
b(n+ k + 1)
=
Na¡ w(n®H + k®L)
b(n+ k + 1)
: (7)
Substituting the equilibrium quantities as given by (5) and (6) into (1) and (3)
shows that the equilibrium pro¯t for ¯rm t is equal to bq2t .
We can now examine how a wage increase a®ects equilibrium quantities (and
thus pro¯ts). Inspecting equations (5) and (6) we can immediately see that qL is
strictly larger than qH if the wage level, w, is positive and the term in brackets in
the numerator is strictly positive. In this particular case qL increases with higher
wages, since the sign in front of w is positive. On the other hand, qH is strictly
decreasing in w. This follows from the sign in front of w being negative and the
term in brackets in the numerator being strictly positive. If, however, the type-H
¯rms do not enter the market, with n = 0 holding, equation (5) reduces to
~qL =
a¡ ®Lw
b(k + 1)
; (8)
where the tilde indicates that N = k ¯rms are active on the product market. In
this case, type-L ¯rms' production quantities are strictly decreasing in w, what
can be immediately seen from inspecting equation (8). The following Lemma
(1) summarizes the comparative static results of each ¯rm-type's equilibrium
quantity with respect to w.
Lemma 1 (i) Type-H ¯rms' equilibrium quantities strictly decrease for increa-
sing values of w. Equilibrium quantities are positive (qH > 0) for w 2 [0; w0[
8Second-order conditions are satis¯ed: ¡b(k +1) < 0 for type-L ¯rms and ¡b(n+1) < 0 for
type-H ¯rms. For expositional convenience we will not explicitly mark optimal values.
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with w0 ´ a®H+k(®H¡®L) . For wages equal to or larger than w0 type-H ¯rms do
not enter the market. (ii) As long as all N ¯rms are active, i.e. w 2 [0; w0[,
type-L ¯rms' equilibrium quantities are (weakly) increasing in w if and only if
®H
®L
¸ n+1
n
. If, however, ®H
®L
< n+1
n
, the equilibrium quantities of type-L ¯rms
are strictly decreasing in wages. (iii) For w 2 [w0; (a=®L)[ only the k ¯rms of
type L are active; their equilibrium quantities are strictly decreasing in w over
this range. For w > (a=®L) no ¯rm produces. (iv) Type-L ¯rms' pro¯ts reach a
global maximum at w = w0 if and only if
®H
®L
¸ n+1
n
. (v) Total industry output,
Q, strictly decreases with increasing wage rates.
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Part (i) and (iii) of Lemma (1) are standard results of any Cournot oligopoly
model: Every ¯rm's pro¯t depends negatively on the industry's overall marginal
production costs. However, as part (ii) reveals this result no longer holds if ¯rms
are su±ciently heterogeneous so that the following condition holds:9
®H
®L
¸ n + 1
n
: (HETERO-1)
In this case, the more e±cient ¯rms (i.e. ¯rms which have relatively low input-
output ratios for labor) actually gain from an industrywide wage increase. As
long as those ¯rms that have a relatively low labor productivity (the type-H
¯rms) do not exit, equilibrium output of ¯rms that have a rather high labor
productivity (type-L ¯rms) strictly increase. As the number of type-H ¯rms
increases to in¯nity, one has
lim
n!1
n+ 1
n
= 1; (9)
and hence, for su±ciently large n (HETERO-1) is always satis¯ed. Furthermore,
according to part (iv) of Lemma (1) pro¯ts for type-L ¯rms reach a maximum
at the point at which type-H ¯rms just decide not to enter or just exit the mar-
ket. Finally, part (v) of Lemma (1) states that total industry output is strictly
9HETERO is a mnemonics for `heterogeneity'.
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decreasing as w increases. Since we assume a linear production technology this
implies that the level of total industry employment decreases for increasing wage
rates.
Figure (1) depicts the shift of the best response functions in the duopoly case
(i.e., k = n = 1) when the standard wage increases and the (HETERO-1) condition
holds. The best response function for the type-L ¯rm, BRL, as given by equation
(2) is qL =
1
2b
(a¡bqH ¡®Lw), and the best response function for the type-H ¯rm,
BRH , as given by equation (4) is qH =
1
2b
(a¡bqL¡®Hw). According to equations
(5) and (6) equilibrium quantities are qL =
a+w(®H¡2®L)
3b
for the type-L ¯rm and
qH =
a¡w(2®H¡®L)
3b
for the type-H ¯rm. Obviously, given that the (HETERO-1)
condition is ful¯lled an increase in the standard wage reduces the equilibrium
quantity of the type-H ¯rm and increases the equilibrium quantity of the type-L
¯rm. Figure (1) illustrates these facts. BR1H and BR
2
L are the best response
functions for the representative type-H and the representative type-L ¯rm in the
initial situation 1, in which w = w1. Equilibrium quantities are given by qL(w1)
and qH(w1). In situation 2 the standard wage is increased to w2 > w1. Therefore,
the two best response functions shift inwards and are represented by BR2L and
BR2H . In the new equilibrium the quantity of the type-H ¯rm decreases to qH(w2)
while the quantity of the type-L ¯rm increases to qL(w2).
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium quantities for the type-H ¯rm, qH , and for the
type-L ¯rm, qL, whenever the type-L ¯rm gains from an increase in wages as long
as all ¯rms are active; i.e. (HETERO-1) holds. For any given positive wage level
the type-L ¯rm's market share is greater than the market share of its type-H rival
and the type-L ¯rm's production quantity is increasing until the limit wage, w0,
is reached. The thick curve in Figure 2 represents the type-L ¯rm's equilibrium
pro¯ts, ¦L, which are strictly convex in w.
10 Pro¯ts increase for wages below the
10The strict convexity of ¦L can be easily checked by substituting the equilibrium quantities
into type-L ¯rm's pro¯t function ¦L = bq2L, and di®erentiating with respect to w twice. For
wages below w0 we obtain
d2 ¦L
d w2
= 2
b
(n®H¡®L(n+1)
k+n+1
)2 > 0, and for wages w 2 [w0; a®L [ we get
d2 ¦L
d w2 =
2
b (
®L
k+1 )
2 > 0.
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Figure 1: Best Response Functions: Duopoly Case
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limit wage and decrease for higher wages.
2.2 First-Stage Equilibrium: Wage Setting
Next, we look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. We thus examine
the Nash equilibria in the wage setting stage, taking the optimal strategies in
every subgame as given. We de¯ne an employers' association as a group of ¯rms
with homogeneous interests in the wage setting process. This means, every ¯rm
within the employers' association must (weakly) prefer the wage proposal of the
employers' association compared to the initial situation's wage. Since type-H
¯rms would never agree to a higher wage than the existing one, we assume that
type-L ¯rms can coordinate to establish an employers' association by excluding
the type-H ¯rms. Alternatively, we may interpret the type-L ¯rms as the incum-
bents and the type-H ¯rms as the potential entrants, which are relatively less
e±cient.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Quantities and Type-L Firm's Pro¯ts
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Furthermore, we assume that, in absence of any labor market institutions such
as an employers' association or a union, the initial labor market wage, w^, is the
e±cient equilibrium wage realized in a perfectly competitive market. Therefore,
the initial wage, w^, represents each worker's reservation utility, so that for any
wage proposal below w^ labor supply within the sector is zero.
In the following, we analyze the wage setting under the two regimes monopolistic
employers' association (ME) and bilateral monopoly (BM).
2.2.1 Monopolistic Employers' Association (ME)
Given the initial labor market wage w^, the employers' association now chooses a
wage wME (the superscript \ME" indicates the monopolistic employers' associa-
tion regime) which solves the maximization problem
max
w
¦i = (a¡ bQL ¡ cL)qi for all i = 1; . . . ; k (10)
s.t. w^ · wME (11)
12
qi ¸ 0; for all i = 1; . . . ; k: (12)
Constraint (11) re°ects the fact that the wage o®er of the employers' association,
WME , can not fall below workers' reservation wage, which prevails in the absence
of any labor market institutions. For any sectorial wage proposal below the initial
wage, w^, there would be no worker willing to work in this sector. Furthermore,
every individual ¯rm's pro¯ts within the employers' association must (weakly)
increase when compared to a situation without an employers' association. Gi-
ven the objective function (10) of the employers' association, this constraint is
satis¯ed because all ¯rms within the employers' association are identical.
Let -0 denote the set of vectors !0 = (®H ; ®L; k; n) 2 R4+ that satisfy (HETERO-1).
This enables us to summarize the solution to the above maximization problem as
follows.
Proposition 1 For !0 2 -0 wage setting by the employers' association is cha-
racterized by the following properties: (i) The employers' association maximizes
members' pro¯ts by setting the standard wage equal to w0, and hence deters type-
H ¯rms from entering the market. (ii) Wages increase if the initial wage level is
below w0 with the consequence of less sectorial employment. (iii) Wages do not
change if the initial wage is higher than w0; full employment is realized and wages
remain at w^.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1 we know that type-L ¯rms' pro¯ts are maximized at w0 if and
only if the (HETERO-1) condition holds. Therefore, all type-L ¯rms would like to
increase the standard wage to w0 for initial wage levels below w0. As a result total
industry output and sectorial employment levels decrease. If the market-clearing
wage, w^, is higher than the limit wage, w0, the employers' association would like
to reduce the wage rate below the initial wage, w^. However, as w^ denotes the
workers' reservation wage rate, they will not accept to work for less.
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2.2.2 Bilateral Monopoly (BM)
Now let us consider the case where the employers' association has to bargain about
the standard wage with a single union, but where the employers' association has
all the bargaining power. That means, the employers' association makes a take-it
or leave-it wage o®er to the union. The union then either accepts or rejects the
o®er. If the union does not accept the o®er, the initial wage rate of w^ prevails.
We pose that the employers' association and union can only bargain about the
standard wage rate of the industry. In contrast to e±cient bargaining models, in
which parties bargain about wages and employment levels, we adopt the right-
to-manage assumption. According to the right-to-manage assumption all ¯rms
retain the right to decide about their employment levels individually. In our
model, each ¯rm's employment decision is determined by its optimal production
strategy in the second stage of the game.
Given these circumstances we assume that the union will accept a wage o®er if
and only if overall wage revenues in the industry are at least as large as in the
initial situation. This participation constraint of the union can be formulated as
W (wEA) ¸ W (w^); (13)
where W indicates wage revenues and wEA stands for the wage o®er of the em-
ployers' association. The union will accept the wage o®er, wEA, if and only if wage
revenues under the proposed wage, W (wEA), are at least as high as in the initial
situation, in which wage revenues are given by W (w^). This means, the employ-
ers' association is restricted to wage o®ers that satisfy the union's participation
constraint (13).
Before we derive the wage o®er function of the employers' association, we carefully
analyze the wage revenue schedule which is identical to the union's objective
14
function. The wage revenue function, W , is given by
W ´
8>>><>>>:
WN = [k®LqL(w) + n®HqH(w)]w; for 0 · w < w0
Wk = [k®L~qL(w)]w ; for w0 · w < a®L
0 ; for a
®L
· w;
(14)
where qL, qH , and ~qL are given by (5), (6), and (8). The union's revenue function
(14) consists of three parts. For wage levels w 2 [0; w0[ all ¯rms are active, so
that both type-H and type-L ¯rms contribute to industry wage revenues. For
wages above the limit wage, w0, only the e±cient type-L ¯rms remain active on
the product market, and wage revenues are given by Wk. Of course, for wages
above a
®L
even type-L ¯rms do not enter the market, so that wage revenues are
zero in this case.
Both wage revenue functions WN and Wk are strictly concave with respect to w.
Hence, there are in principle two candidate values of w at which the union's overall
wage revenue function is maximized. Wage revenue might reach its absolute
maximum at a wage below the limit wage, w0, or at a wage above the limit
wage. In the former case the union prefers all N = k + n ¯rms being active on
the product market. In the latter case, the union maximizes overall wage revenue
when only the type-L ¯rms produce and the type-H ¯rms do not enter the market.
In order to derive the wage o®er function of the employers' association, we now
derive some properties of the wage revenue schedule. For this purpose let us
take a closer look at the union's decision problem in absence of any employers'
association, i.e., in the case in which the union acts as a wage setting monopolist.
Presumably, the union now chooses wU to maximize total wage revenue (the
superscript \U" stands for union)11
max
w
W (15)
s.t. qt ¸ 0; for all t = 1; . . . ; N: (16)
11For the sake of simplicity we assume that the industry is small such that the countries'
price level is independent of the industry's wage agreement. However, the following results will
not change qualitatively if the union were maximizing real wage revenues.
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Substituting the ¯rms' equilibrium quantities (5), (6), and (8) into the wage
revenue function (14), we obtain the union's reduced objective function
WN =
w[a(k®L + n®H)¡ w(n®2H + nk(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L)]
b(k + n + 1)
; (17)
for all w 2 [0; w0[, i.e., if all N ¯rms are active, and
Wk =
wk®L(a¡w®L)
b(k + 1)
; for w 2 [w0; (a=®L)[; (18)
if only the k type-L ¯rms are active. Di®erentiation of WN with respect to w
yields the maximizer12
wUN =
a(k®L + n®H)
2(n®2H + nk(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L)
: (19)
Similarly, we get the maximizer for Wk as13
wUk =
a
2®L
: (20)
As long as the wage revenue function is monotonically increasing up to w0 the
union will accept the wage o®er w0 for initial wage levels w^ 2 [0; w0[. The union's
wage revenue function for the interval [0; w0[ is WN . This function is strictly
concave in w.14 Hence, wage revenues are monotonically increasing up to w0 if
and only if the maximizer of WN , which is given by equation (19), is larger than
the entry deterring wage, w0. In this case, parties interest match for all initial
wage levels below the entry deterring wage w0.
If, however, wUN is smaller than the limit wage w0 the picture becomes more
complicated since w0 is not necessarily self-enforcing for any initial wage below
w0 anymore. In this case WN reaches its absolute maximum at a wage below the
limit wage such that
wUN < w0 (21)
holds. The following Lemma 2 speci¯es the condition under which inequality (21)
is satis¯ed.
12The second-order condition is satis¯ed: ¡(n®2H + nk(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L) < 0.
13The second order condition is globally satis¯ed, since ¡ 2k®2L
b(k+1)
< 0.
14See second derivative of WN with respect to w is strictly negative (see Footnote 12).
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Lemma 2 There exists a vector of parameters ! 2 R4 such that wUN < w0 is
satis¯ed if and only if
®2H
®2L
n(k + 1)¡ ®H
®L
k(3n+ k + 1) + k(2n+ k + 2) > 0: (HETERO-2)
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The left-hand side of (HETERO-2) is a U-shaped function in ®H
®L
which has two
potential roots along the real axis.15 Straight forward inspection of (HETERO-2)
yields that the condition is the sooner ful¯lled, the closer ®H
®L
is to one.16 In the
Appendix we also provide some numerical examples which illustrate that there
are cases, where (HETERO-2) is not ful¯lled, with wage revenues monotonically
increasing in wages up to w0.
In the case where only k type-L ¯rms are active the following condition assures
that the maximum of the wage revenue function Wk is at w = w
U
k to the right of
w0:
wUk =
a
2®L
>
a
®H + k(®H ¡ ®L) = w0
) ®H
®L
>
k + 2
k + 1
: (HETERO-3)
Given that both the (HETERO-2) and (HETERO-3) condition hold the following
condition (HETERO-4) assures that the absolute maximum of the union's wage
revenues, W , is reached at wUN to the left of w0 with all ¯rms active:
WN(w
U
N ) > Wk(w
U
k )
, a
2(n®H + k®L)
2
4b(n+ k + 1)[n®2H + nk(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L]
>
a2k
4b(k + 1)
) ®H
®L
<
k2 + nk + 2k
k2 + nk + k ¡ n: (HETERO-4)
15In the Appendix we explicitly calculate the roots and derive the condition such that those
solutions are real. If there exists no real root the condition holds for all parameter vectors
! 2 R+.
16Indeed, (HETERO-2) is ful¯lled for all ! 2 R4, whenever the productivity di®erence between
the L-¯rms and the H-¯rms vanishes.
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It is easily checked that the left-hand side of (HETERO-4) is strictly greater than
one. Based on these intermediate results concerning the wage revenue function,
we can now formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If ! 2 -0 satis¯es the conditions (HETERO-2), (HETERO-3), and (HE-
TERO-4), then wUN < w0 < w
U
k and WN(w
U
N ) > W (w
U
k ).
Proof. Follows directly from conditions (HETERO-2), (HETERO-3), and (HETERO-4).
Q.E.D.
To show the existence of a parameter range that satis¯es the conditions of Lemma
3 and (HETERO-1), we state the following su±cient conditions:
Lemma 4 Let n > k+1 and k ¸ 5. Then conditions (HETERO-1) to (HETERO-4)
are satis¯ed for all ®H
®L
2]k+2
k+1
; k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n [.
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 states the conditions of an interval for ®H
®L
such that for the wage
revenue function wUN < w0 < w
U
k and WN (w
U
N) > W (w
U
k ) holds. In the following,
we restrict attention to those parameter vectors ! which are given by Lemma
4.17 Therefore, let us now introduce the following parameter restrictions, which
assure that those conditions are met: Let ! = (®H ; ®L; k; n) 2 R4+ be the vector
of parameters which characterizes the heterogeneity and the scale -in terms of the
number of ¯rms- of the two ¯rm groups. Moreover, let - denote the restricted
domain of parameters that satis¯es (HETERO-1) to (HETERO4), n > k + 1 and
k ¸ 5.
This means, we assume that the union's wage revenue function has two relative
maxima, one to the left of w0 with all ¯rms being active, and one to the right
17Restricting the parameter range in this fashion enables us to keep all strategic incentives
while simplifying exposition considerably. See Haucap et al. 1999 for an analysis of wage setting
when the union prefers a wage rate above the entry deterring wage, w0.
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of w0 with only the type-L ¯rms producing. Moreover, we assume that the
overall revenue maximum is reached at a wage, where all ¯rms enter the market.
Under these conditions, the employers' association and the union have con°icting
interest, with respect to the optimal standard wage. The employers' association
favors a wage close to the limit wage such that less e±cient ¯rms are deterred
from entering the market. In contrast, the union wants to implement a standard
wage at which all ¯rms produce.
Now we can examine the wage o®er function, © = ©EA(w^), that assigns the
optimal wage o®er of the employers' association to every initial wage level, w^;
i.e., ©EA(w^) = wEA. For any given w^ the employers' association chooses a wage
o®er wEA which solves the following maximization problem:
max
w
¦L(w) (22)
s.t. ¦L(w^) · ¦L(wEA) (23)
W (w^) · W (wEA) (24)
w^ · wEA: (25)
The wage o®er of the employers' association, wEA, has to meet the members'
participation constraint (23), the union's participation constraint (24), and the
condition (25) that wages cannot fall below the workers' reservation wage.
Figure (3) graphs the wage revenue functions, WN and Wk, and the type-L ¯rm's
pro¯t function, ¦L for ! 2 -. From (HETERO-1) we know that type-L ¯rms'
pro¯ts increase up to w0 and decrease for higher values of w. The (HETERO-2)
condition implies that the maximum of WN lies to the left of the limit wage
w0 and (HETERO-3) guarantees that the maximum of Wk lies to the right of
w0. Furthermore, condition (HETERO-4) assures that the union's wage revenue
function reaches its absolute maximum when all ¯rms are active.
If the initial wage w^ is below w1 (region (a)) the union's interest and interest of the
employers' association match, and the employers' association can set the pro¯t
maximizing entry deterring wage w0 which is self-enforcing. At w0 wage revenue
19
Figure 3: Critical Wage Intervals: WN (wUN ) > Wk(w
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Wk(w0) is larger than the initial wage revenue. The employers' association cannot
put through the limit wage, w0, if the wage is in region (b) because wage revenues
are lower at that point. Holding initial wage revenues constant, the employers'
association might propose a wage which lies between w3 and w0 or a wage that
lies in the interval [w0; wUk [.
In the former case the union acts as an imperfect countervailing power, because it
prevents the employers' association from setting the entry deterring wage. In the
latter case, the employers' association proposes a wage above the entry deterring
wage in order to ful¯ll the union's participation constraint (24). For initial wages
between w2 and w3 the employers' association cannot increase the wage rate to
the entry deterring level because the wage revenue is always lower when only the
k type-L ¯rms remain active. As long as the initial wage is in region (c) the
employers' association can increase pro¯ts by proposing a wage which is to the
right of the maximum of the wage revenue function, WN , while keeping wage
revenues constant. Therefore, wages increase but not to the entry deterring level;
the n type-H ¯rms stay in the market with reduced equilibrium quantities.
If the initial wage is in region (d) the union and the employers' association have
20
opposite interests. Hence, the wage does not change, and the initially e±cient
wage prevails. To put it di®erently, the union is a perfect countervailing power
which makes it impossible for the employers' association to enforce an increase
of the standard wage.
If the initial wage is in region (e) this might be the case as well, but it is also
possible that the same happens as in region (b): The employers' association
proposes a wage increase above the entry deterring level while keeping the union's
wage revenues constant. In regions (f) and (g) the employers' association would
like to reduce the wage below the initial wage level. However, this is not possible
since workers will not accept to work for less and ¯rms compete for workers until
w = w^. Therefore, for initial wage levels above the limit wage, w0, there is no
labor market distortion.
The following Proposition (2) summarizes the results and characterizes the opti-
mal wage o®er for any given initial wage w^.
Proposition 2 For all ! 2 - the wage o®er function ©EA(w^) is characterized
by the following six intervals for the initial wage, w^:
(a) for w^ 2 [0; w1[, the employers' association chooses wEAa = w0,
(b) for w^ 2 [w1; w2[, the employers' association chooses (i) wEAb1 2 [w0; wUk [
s.t. WN (w^) = W k(wEAb1 ) if ¦L(w
EA
b1 ) > ¦L(w
EA
b2 ), and (ii) w
EA
b2 2 [w3; w0[
s.t. WN (w^) = WN(wEAb2 ) if ¦L(w
EA
b2 ) > ¦L(w
EA
b1 ),
(c) for w^ 2 [w2; wUN [, the employers' association chooses wEAc 2 [wUN ; w3[ s.t.
WN (w^) =WN (wEAc ),
(d) for w^ 2 [wUN ; w3[, the employers' association chooses wEAd = w^,
(e) for w^ 2 [w3; w0[, the employers' association chooses (i) wEAe1 2 [w0; wUk [
s.t. WN(w^) = Wk(w
EA
e1 ) if ¦L(w
EA
e1 ) ¸ ¦L(w^), and (ii) wEAe2 = w^ otherwise,
(f) and (g) for w^ 2 [w0; (a=®L)[, the employers' association does not propose a
change of the initial wage level.
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Proof. Follows directly from inspection of Figure 3. Q.E.D.
Figure (4) depicts the wage o®er function when the employers' association propo-
ses a take-it or leave-it o®er to the union and all four (HETERO) conditions hold.18
The 45± line re°ects all e±cient wage agreements, since we assume an e±cient la-
bor market equilibrium to persist in the absence of any labor market institutions.
First, notice that the employers' association would always set the entry deterring
wage w0 if there were no union. This would reduce sectorial employment levels
for initial wage levels below w0. Next, we introduced a union which has the power
to make sure that wage revenues cannot decrease. As Figure 4 reveals the union's
power to oppose wage revenue reductions may have ¯ve e®ects:
1. Neutralization: The initial e±cient wage prevails for w^ 2 [wUN ; w3[. The
employers' association and the union neutralize each other. This means
that the very existence of unions might deter the employers' association
from setting the limit wage, and therefore induces labor market e±ciency.
2. Impotency: For initial wage levels w^ 2 [0; w1[ the employers' association
can set its pro¯t maximizing wage level w0 as if there were no union. In
this case the limit wage w0 is self-enforcing.
3. Over-deterrence: The wage rate might increase above the entry deterring
level w0 if w^ 2 [w1; w2[[ [w3; w0[. In those cases, the employers' association
has to propose a wage level higher than w0 to meet the union's participation
constraint. Thus, sectorial employment is lower with, than without, an
industrywide union.
4. Relief: For initial wage levels w^ 2 [w2; wUN [ unions induce a move towards
the e±cient wage level, compared to a situation without unions (regime
I). The employers' association can reduce type-H ¯rms' output but they
cannot induce them to exit the market.
18In addition, we assume that the optimal wage o®er of the employers' association for initial
wages in regions (b) and (e) is to propose a wage above the entry deterring wage. This means,
the optimal wage o®er is for region (b) wEAb1 and for region (e) w
EA
e1 .
22
5. E±cient markets: The e±cient wage w^ is sustainable for initial wage levels
w^ 2 [w0; (a=®L)[.
Therefore, in contrast to conventional wisdom, it might be the case that the
existence of a centralized union in the bargaining process is e±ciency enhancing.
Given that wage agreements are expected to be generally binding, the union
might act as a countervailing power, which prevents the employers' association
from setting the entry deterring wage. In our model, this result depends on
the fact that the union might strictly prefer a wage below the limit wage. The
conditions for such a situation are stated in Lemma 3. However, if at least one of
the conditions (HETERO-2) and (HETERO-4) is violated, the union strictly prefers
a wage above the limit wage. Under these circumstances it could be the case that
the union's and the employers' association interests perfectly match, so that both
parties strictly prefer to increase the standard wage up to the limit wage.
Is is also possible that the union prefers a wage higher than the limit wage. If
the union would have all the bargaining power, it would then push the standard
wage to higher levels than the employers' association would do. While many
people appear to believe that this is always the case, our analysis has identi¯ed
the conditions under which the contrary is true.
Having analyzed the model, let us now examine German labor market institutions
in greater detail to give support to the cost raising strategies described above.
3 The German Collective Bargaining System
3.1 The Legal Basis of Collective Bargaining
In contrast to the USA, Canada, and Japan where wage bargaining occurs at
¯rm-level alone, wage negotiations in Germany are mainly at both, the natio-
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Figure 4: Employers' Association's Wage-O®er Curve
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nal and the sectorial level.19 As mentioned above, one core institution of the
German labor market, the so-called Tarifautonomie, empowers unions, employ-
ers and employers' associations to bargain and negotiate collectively and almost
without state intervention. This right is based on Article 9 III of the German
constitution (Grundgesetz, GG), which guarantees the freedom to establish and
join associations in order to maintain and promote working conditions.
Furthermore, the legal nature of the collective bargaining process is speci¯ed in
the Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG). x1 TVG de¯nes unions, employers and employers'
associations as exclusive bargaining parties. x3 TVG makes clear that in general
only members of the bargaining parties are actually bound to obey the regulations
of the contract. In x4 TVG the normative character of the bargaining agreements
is emphasized. All bargaining parties have to comply with the agreement and, in
general, deviations are only possible if the agreement explicitly allows them or if
19For a cross-nation comparison of wage bargaining systems see Bunn 1984 and Layard et
al. 1991.
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they are in favor of the employee (TVG x4 III (GÄunstigkeitsprinzip)).
Although only those unions, employers and employers' associations that are in-
volved as bargaining parties are bound by the contract (x3 I TVG) the coverage
of the agreement goes way beyond the bargaining parties themselves.
Interestingly, collective bargaining contracts can be made compulsory for unor-
ganized employers by a legal authority. x5 TVG provides the bargaining partners
with such a device, the so-called AllgemeinverbindlicherklÄarung (AVE).
3.2 The AllgemeinverbindlicherklÄarung (AVE)
3.2.1 The AVE's Prerequisites
The ¯rst prerequisite to declare an employment contract to be generally binding
is the existence of a legal collective bargaining agreement. At least 50 per cent of
employees in the tari® area for which an AVE is initiated have to be employed in
¯rms of contract-bound employers (x5 I1. TVG). As Lindena/HÄohmann 1988a,
466 argue that this condition prevents a prospective majority of unorganized
employers from being forced to obey a contract they never signed.
Secondly, the AVE must be \in the public interest" (x5 I 2. TVG).20 However,
an AVE can even be put into force if the two conditions are not met, but there
exists some social emergency (sozialer Notstand) according to x5 I TVG.
3.2.2 Implementation of the AVE
In order to initiate an AVE one of the bargaining parties has to apply for it at
the Ministry of Labor. Unorganized employees and employers concerned, as well
as employers' associations, unions and the Ministry of Labor of the state a®ected
by the AVE are given the right to express their opinion. Afterwards a public
20For some critical remarks concerning this precondition see below.
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hearing of a council consisting of three representatives of umbrella organizations
of unions and employers respectively (Tarifausschu¼) is initiated (x12 TVG).21
The council decides with the majority of votes whether or not to recommend the
use of an AVE to the Ministry of Labor. While the Ministry of Labor is not
bound to put an AVE into force if the council recommends one, it may only put
an AVE into force if the council recommends it. However, in the latter case the
Ministry is not forced to follow the council's opinion (Meyer 1992, 366).22
Once an AVE has been put into force it remains e®ective until the collective
bargaining contract expires or the Ministry of Labor puts the AVE out of force
(x5 V TVG).
3.2.3 The Scope of AVEs
Between 1968 and 1991 the total number of AVEs e®ective has increased from
158 (1968) to 622 (1991). Since 1980 the average number of AVEs e®ective has
varied between 500 and 600 per year. About one million workers are additionally
a®ected by these orders (Meyer 1992, 366).23
Most sectors a®ected by AVEs are characterized by many small ¯rms, low skilled
workers, low capital labor ratios, a slow expansion of domestic demand and a
comparatively low extent of organized employers and employees (Deregulierungs-
kommission 1991, 151). Thus, AVEs appear to set minimum wage standards
because of their concentration in low wage sectors (SachverstÄandigenrat 1995,
21For the employers' side the representatives are appointed by the top organization, the Bund
Deutscher ArbeitgeberverbÄande, while for the union's side there are two representatives of the
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund and one of the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (Kreimer-
de Fries 1995, 211). It is important to note that the bargaining partners themselves are not
members of the council. Theoretically, an AVE can be put into force notwithstanding the
interest of one bargaining partner.
22In practice, the Ministry of Labor generally follows the council's recommendation as Lin-
dena/HÄohmann 1989, 5 report.
23Kreimer-de Fries 1995, 212 estimate that even 1.5 to 1.7 million workers or 5 to 6 per cent
of the working force is additionally a®ected.
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228). The requirement, that the Ministry of Labor can only put AVEs into force
if this is justi¯ed by the public interest, is a very weak and imprecise constraint
(Deregulierungskommission 1991, 151). To give an example, AVEs are argued
to serve the public interest if they are intended to abolish low-wage competition
(Schmutzkonkurrenz) (see Lindena/HÄohmann 1988a, 466) or to induce equal wor-
king conditions across ¯rms in a particular industry (see Clasen 1988, 27). Hence,
the political agent has some considerable leeway that might lead to an extension
of collective bargaining agreements well beyond today's scope.24
The social-emergency-clause (x5 I TVG) can be considered to be a further loo-
phole to extend AVEs since it waives the requirements that the public interest
is served and that at least 50 per cent of the employees of the tari® area con-
cerned have to be employed by contract-bound ¯rms. This provision is used in
cases where most employers are not organized as, for example, in agriculture and
where the working conditions are \inadequate" (see Meyer 1992, 365). There is no
clear-cut de¯nition as to what establishes a social-emergency-case.25 So the dis-
cretionary leeway of the Ministry of Labor is expanded once more (LÄowisch/Rieble
1992, 318).
However, as long as the organizational density of employers is high, it is not very
surprising that the direct impact of AVEs is low.26 But the declining number of
¯rms that are members of employers' associations in East Germany might lead
to further requests to use AVEs (SachverstÄandigenrat 1995, 231). And organi-
zational problems do not only exist in East Germany, but in West Germany as
24Moreover, as Ring 1994, 356 reports it is extremely di±cult to examine in court whether
the public interest is really served.
25Most authors claim that considerable wage di®erentials (\social distortions") between sec-
tors already establish a social emergency (see DÄaubler/Hege 1981, 222) or Hegemeier 1990,
587).
26In this context it is interesting to note that both employers' associations and unions heavily
oppose any criticism concerning AVEs although they claim that the scope of AVEs is minor.
(For the employers' association see Lindena/HÄohmann (1988a, 1988b, 1989) and for the union
side Kreimer-de Fries 1995).
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well; a growing number of ¯rms have cancelled their organizational membership
(Keller 1997, 16 and OECD 1994, 176). There are some indicators that the gro-
wing problems for employers' associations to maintain their membership enhance
the importance of AVEs. Despite of lip service of representatives of employers'
associations concerning the minor importance of AVEs, the regional East German
wage agreements in retail trade were extended using this instrument (Kreimer-
de Fries 1995, 224). Moreover, on the employers' side it was even considered to
apply AVEs in the metal producing sector in East Germany (Kreimer-de Fries
1995, 222).
Although direct e®ects of the AVE regulation are of minor importance today, its
threat-point character and the indirect e®ects might be enormous.27 The threat-
point character of the AVEs has also been recognized by the German Monopolies
Commission as it writes: \The cartel e®ect of collective agreements is increased
by the possibility to declare them generally binding. It is misleading to play
down the importance of this legal institution by pointing at the low number of
collective bargaining agreements declared generally binding. In January 1994, 544
of 41700 collective bargaining agreements have been declared generally binding.
However, these contracts aim just at those industries in which the eroding e®ects
on collective bargaining agreements through outside competition would be extre-
mely strong . . . Moreover, this legal institution contains a normative threat-point
potential which aims at stabilizing the system." (Monopolkommission 1994, 380)
27In international comparison of such extension rules, France is a quite vivid example. There
\around half of all sectorial agreements are usually extended by government decree" (OECD
1994, 171). It is not surprising that in spite of a very low union density rate of 10 per cent (the
lowest rate of all OECD countries) the collective bargaining coverage rate is extremely high (at
a level of 90 per cent) (OECD 1994, 173).
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3.3 Institutional Settings and Collective Bargaining Co-
verage Rate
Aside from AVEs, additional institutional arrangements help to establish high
wage standards under the German wage setting system, which is characterized
by a relatively high (although declining) coverage rate of collective bargaining
agreements.28
The organization rate of employers is already high in Germany. In spite of di®e-
rences in empirical concepts, there is broad consensus that around 80 per cent of
the workforce are employed by ¯rms which are members of employers' associations
(Keller 1997, 16 and Franz 1996, 250).
Although contract-bound employers are not forced to pay the same wages to
non-union members this seems rational because they are interested in industrial
peace, but also because they would force their unorganized workers to join the
union otherwise. However, even the small number of employers not bound by
contract often o®er employment conditions comparable to those agreed upon in
collective bargaining contracts. This is often done to forestall a unionization of
their ¯rms or to avoid the costs of increasing turnovers if, for example, workers
are attracted by supposedly higher paying schemes in organized ¯rms.
A key feature of the German wage setting process is the major importance of
pilot agreements (PilotabschlÄusse). Collective bargaining agreements are made
on a sectorial basis for each region (wage tari® area). The regions in which the
pilot agreements are made are mostly characterized by high union density as well
as large ¯rms which can be struck easily (Molitor 1997, 158, fn. 178). In the
metal producing sector pilot agreements are usually signed in the wage tari® area
of NordwÄurttemberg-Nordbaden - a region where the most pro¯table and dynamic
metal manufacturers in Germany are located. This might easily lead to wage
28The collective bargaining coverage rate amounts to about 90 per cent while the union
density rate is about 32 per cent (OECD 1994, 173 and Halbach et al. 1991, 181).
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agreements which are above the market-clearing level if these agreements are
simply adopted for economically weaker regions.
Once a sectorial agreement in a speci¯c region is signed this agreement sets a
standard and is followed by almost all other regions of this sector. What is
even more important is that there is not only a coordination between regions
of the same sector but also between the sectors as a whole. Especially pilot
agreements in the metalworking sector (and sometimes the public sector) are
almost completely adopted by other sectors with respect to issues such as wage
increases and working time regulations (OECD 1994, 175).
Because of the minimum standard character of collective bargaining agreements
described above these contracts are generally binding for almost the entire work-
force.29 Up to now we have only described that there are voluntary extensions of
collective bargaining agreements. The key question concerning our model, howe-
ver, is why employers or employers' associations in other regions with a weaker
economic performance do not try to achieve competitive advantages by signing
low wage agreements. Even without any legal extension rule as the AVE, internal
policies of employers' associations already seem to stabilize the cartel. Hence, we
now want to examine the associations' and the unions' incentive structure.
3.4 Employers' Associations from a Public Choice Per-
spective
Let us now take a closer look at the incentives regional and sectorial employers'
associations face when a collective bargaining agreement with high wage stan-
dards has been reached.30 In the context of our model, the association is not
29Of course, there is no stringent and perfect coordination between the di®erent sectorial
agreements. It is important to note, however, that in general all wage increases and working
time regulations once agreed upon in one sector are adopted by other sectors within a fairly
short period of time.
30This analysis follows Molitor 1997, 216 ®.
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interested in lower wage agreements anywhere else in the industry while the re-
gional union section is not interested in lower wages in other regions.31 What
kind of instruments are now available for these regional players to pursue their
interests? First, the union will most likely try to expand the collective agreement
reached in the high-standard region. Only excessive unemployment problems can
be expected to induce lower wage demands or concession bargaining.
Empirically, however, such regional di®erences in wage trends are hard to ¯nd
(see Paqu¶e 1991, 35). Hence, it is quite likely that the regional union will ¯ght
to get its favored agreement. It is also important that the regional union can
rely on the solidarity of the nationwide union which has a large strike fund at
its disposal. Thus, the incentives of the union as a whole as well as the regional
union sections go hand in hand. The union side cannot be expected to su®er
from solidarity problems. The regional employers' associations on the other side
can try to in°uence members in other regions to follow the agreement with the
assistance of the nationwide top association. Whether this kind of moral suasion
is e®ective, however, is rather unclear.
If employers' associations in other regions now want to follow a low wage stra-
tegy and thereby provokes a strike, problems will arise.32 In general employers'
associations are not only pressure groups, but they can rather be characterized
as anti-strike insurance agencies.33 All bargaining employers' associations have
built up relief funds to support members confronted with strikes.
Particularly in the metalworking sector there are regional employers' relief funds
and a coordination agreement that provides regional employers' associations with
an interregional support system (Gefahrengemeinschaft).
Concerning the incentives of the employers' association that signed the pilot
31This can be expected not only for organizational purposes, but also for ideological reasons
expressed by slogans such as \equal pay for equal work".
32For the following reasoning see also Molitor 1997, 223 ®.
33It is important to note that historically this insurance function was a key factor for the
formation of employers' associations (see Erdmann 1966, 53).
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agreement mentioned above it is very unlikely that this association is willing
to support industrial warfare for lower wage agreements in other regions. The
employers' association for metal workers Gesamtmetall, even has established gui-
delines according to which resources of the interregional support system can only
be used in labor disputes of more than just regional importance (Gesamtmetall
1993, 2).
When a single regional employers' association is following a low-wage strategy
its bargaining power is considerably reduced. Only the few resources of the
regional relief fund are available whereas the regional union section is supported
by the whole nationwide strike fund. Hence, it is not surprising that perceptible
withdrawals from pilot agreements are unlikely. Even without the threat of an
AVE or other extension rules members of employers' associations are forced to
sign agreements they would not subscribe to otherwise.
Employers which are not members of employers' associations face similar pro-
blems. If they make e®orts to pay lower wages they are also confronted by a
nationwide union strike fund and, even worse, they can not resort to any relief
fund. In summary, the institutional framework and the incentive structures of
employers' associations as well as unions create a self-enforcing mechanism for
rigid wage standards above the market-clearing level.
4 The Deep-Freeze of the East German Eco-
nomy
The economic union between East and West Germany came in mid-1990. Com-
pared to other ex-communist states of Eastern Europe, it was widely believed
that the prospects for success were much brighter in East Germany with its
well-educated and skilled work force and its rich brother generously helping with
infusions of capital, and technological and organizational know-how. However, as
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has been painfully experienced in the last seven years, with economic reuni¯ca-
tion of Germany \one of the worst and sharpest depressions in European history
had begun" (Akerlof et al. 1991, 1); this was especially true for the employment
situation: Manufacturing employment declined by 74 per cent from the second
quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 1993 (Deutsche Bundesbank, June 1994,
p. 84).
From fall 1989 to 1992, one out of three workers -some 3 million people- had
lost their jobs. The largest decline took place in the industrial sector, where
more then 1.7 million jobs were lost.34 As early as 1992 Dornbusch 1992 found
that \Eastern German wages in many sectors now exceed 50 percent of Western
German wage levels." At this time labor productivity in East Germany (based of
GDP per worker) was estimated to be only one third of the West German ¯gure.
Several explanations have been proposed for the large drop in East Germany's
manufacturing employment after uni¯cation. In their outstanding assessment of
the collapse of East Germany's economy Akerlof et al. 1991 identify the price-cost
squeeze due to the shift in demand away from East German goods and the sharp
rise in costs relative to prices as the major problem. While playing down the
impact of the conversion rate which was 1:1, they blame the unions for recklessly
pushing wage parity between East and West Germany. \Their analysis clearly
singles out West German unions as the villains in the collapse" (Dornbusch 1991,
89).
Moreover, according to the endgame hypothesis managers and employers had
incentives to engage in massive oversta±ng just prior to expected decapitalization
and privatization programs (see Aghion et al. 1994). On this line Neumann et
al. 1991, von Hagen 1992, and von Furstenberg 1995 argue that the prospect of
unemployment in a social welfare and insurance system caused pressure for high
wages. While all these theories certainly help to explain the dramatic collapse in
34For the situation of the German labor market after reuni¯cation see Franz 1991, Scheremet
1992, and Scheremet/Schupp 1992.
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East Germany we want to demonstrate that employers' associations are not as
innocent as these theories implicitly suggest.
After the German reuni¯cation the West German collective bargaining system
was immediately adopted by East Germany. Wages increased tremendously.35
Therefore, let us brie°y analyze the situation.36 Immediately after reuni¯cation
West German employers' associations joined the collective bargaining table.37 As
exempli¯ed in our model, West German employers did not have any interest in low
wages in the East. Such a strategy would have devaluated their existing capital in
the West, and introduced competition from the less e±cient East German ¯rms.
Although planned investment in the East would become unpro¯table as a result
of high Eastern wage standards this strategy was useful to hedge the pro¯ts
in the West. On the other hand East German unions were assisted by West
German union representatives because the East German unionists were simply
too unexperienced in matters concerning collective bargaining. The West German
agents, however, were not interested in low wage standards in the East in order
to avoid a competitive disadvantage for their West German members. Following
the implications of our model a collective bargaining agreement was concluded
in March 1991 which aimed at an equalization of wages in East and West until
1994.
As demonstrated in our model both bargaining parties were quite successful in
35Although the productivity in East Germany is quite below the West German level, workers
in the East were paid 69 per cent of their western colleagues' wage per hour in 1996 (Institut
der Deutschen Wirtschaft 1997, chart 137). The resulting increase of unit labor costs seems to
be the major factor for the excessive employment problems in East Germany.
36Our analysis follows Sinn/Sinn 1993, 165 ®.
37Even before reuni¯cation, unions with large memberships were well established in East
Germany. On the other hand, the largest employer was the Treuhand, a state agency. The labor-
managers of these ¯rms were in a con°icting situation. On the one hand they were employers
at the bargaining table. On the other hand they were simply employees of the Treuhand in the
end. Therefore, it was not surprising that these \employers" did not show strong resistance to
wage increases that devalued the existing capital (not owned by themselves).
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pushing through their members' interests by raising wages and avoiding outside
competition. The contrary nature of unions and employers' associations was set
aside in order to stabilize the wage setting cartel.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusions
Standard reasoning emphasizes the e±ciency aspects of employers' associations
in the bargaining process. As, for example, Nickell 1997, 68 concludes: \To sum-
marize, . . . unions are bad for jobs, but these bad e®ects can be nulli¯ed if both
the unions and the employers can coordinate their wage bargaining activities."
In contrast to this position our model has shown that employers' associations
might even worsen wage bargaining outcomes in terms of the employment level
of the industry.38 Furthermore, in contrast to conventional wisdom, our paper
also demonstrates that unions might improve the wage bargaining outcome. A
wage revenue maximizing union may favor a heterogeneous supply structure on
the product market with e±cient and less e±cient ¯rms competing for market
shares. Under such conditions the union might prevent the employers' association
from setting an entry deterring standard wage for the entire industry. In this case
the union acts as an e®ective countervailing power, and therefore, prevents the
employers' association from monopolizing the industry.
In general, the macroeconomic implications of centralized wage bargaining on em-
ployment levels call for an extension of antitrust measures to the labor market.39
Extension rules as the AVE, which make wage settlements generally binding for
the entire industry, therefore, are alleged to be anticompetitive.
Referring to the German case analyzed above, we propose a reform of the AVE. In
particular, the requirements of \public interest" and \social emergency" should be
38A similar result is obtained by Petrakis/Vlassis 1997 who analyze how the centralization
of the wage bargaining process a®ects intra-sectorial wage di®erentials.
39Macroeconomic e®ects of labor market institutions have also been studied by Calm-
fors/Dri±ll 1988 and Jackman et al. 1990.
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formulated as precisely as possible to avoid any misuse of the AVE as a barrier to
entry. Moreover, the application of an AVE should be restricted to matured ¯rms
so that potential new entrants are not a®ected by this instrument for a couple of
years. In this case new ¯rms would have a chance to establish themselves on the
market, and most likely to improve their labor productivity over time.40
While there might be other ways than the AVE system that can make wage
agreements generally binding as, for example, informal norms (Lindbeck/Snower
1988, Lindbeck 1997), these informal governances of enforcing minimum wages
can be expected to work only to a much lesser extent. Therefore, we think that
formal legal means to make standard wage agreements generally binding should
be abolished. If there should be a case for generally binding wage contracts, these
measures should be at least applied in a very careful manner and only under clear-
cut circumstances which have to be formulated as precisely as possible. Based
on the analysis presented here, a substantial reform of the German labor law as
speci¯ed in the TVG seems highly desirable.
Finally, our analysis might also apply to outright minimum wage legislation as,
for example, introduced in Puerto Rico prior to the late 1960s -the devastating
e®ects of which have been well described by Katz 1991. We think a worthwhile
future undertaking is to explore the interests employers have in minimum wage
legislation.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (i). Equilibrium quantity of a type-H ¯rms is given by equation (6). Thus,
@qH
@w
= ¡®H(1+k)+®L
b(k+n+1)
< 0. By de¯nition of w0, qH(w0) = 0. Thus,
a¡w(®H+k(®H¡®L))
b(k+n+1)
=
0, and hence w0 =
a
®H+k(®H¡®L) .
40Petrakis/Vlassis 1997, 22 suggest to target the centralized bargaining system by simply
subsidizing the adoption of the more e±cient technology.
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Part (ii). If all ¯rms are active equations (5) and (6) imply that type-L ¯rms'
equilibrium quantity is given by qL(w) =
a+w(n®H¡®L(n+1))
b(k+n+1)
. Di®erentiation yields
@qL
@w
= n®H¡(n+1)®L
b(k+n+1)
, which is nonnegative if and only if ®L
®H
¸ n+1
n
.
Part (iii). If only the k type-L ¯rms are active each ¯rm i chooses a quantity qi
which solves: maxqi ¦i = (a¡bQL¡cL)qi. Solving the k ¯rst-order conditions for
the equilibrium quantity qL gives ~qL(w) =
a¡®Lw
b(k+1)
. Hence, equilibrium quantity
(and thus pro¯ts) are strictly decreasing in wages. Setting the expression for the
equilibrium quantity equal to zero, we obtain w = (a=®L). Thus, by de¯nition
of w0, the interval of w for which only type-L ¯rms are active is given by w 2
[w0; (a=®L)[.
Part (iv). From (ii) we already know that qL is (weakly) increasing in the interval
[0; w0[ if and only if
®H
®L
¸ n+1
n
. Thus, because qL(w0) is continuous in w0, one has
qL(w0) ¸ qL(w), for all w 2 [0; w0[. For w 2 [w0; (a=®L)[, part (iii) implies that
only ¯rms i = 1; . . . ; k are active and that type-L ¯rm's quantity, ~qL, is strictly
decreasing in w. Therefore, ~qL reaches a maximum at the point w = w0 with
qL(w0) =
a(®H¡®L)
b(®H+k(®H¡®L) . Note that the equilibrium quantity schedule of type-L
¯rms is continuous at w = w0. This can be easily checked by equating qL(w0)
with ~qL(w0). This establishes part (iv) of Lemma 1.
Part (v). Follows directly from equation (7). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
We have to specify the range of parameters for which wUN < w0 holds. Comparison
of wUN and w0 yields
wUN =
a(k®L + n®H)
2(n®2H + nk(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L)
<
a
®H + k(®H ¡ ®L) = w0:
This is equivalent to
1
2
a
®2L(2kn+ 2k + k
2) + ®2H(nk + n)¡ ®H®L(3kn+ k2 + k)
(®H + k(®H ¡ ®L))[kn(®H ¡ ®L)2 + k®2L + n®2H ]
> 0:
Since the denominator of the inequality's left-hand side is strictly positive, rewri-
ting yields
®2H
®2L
n(k + 1)¡ ®H
®L
k(3n+ k + 1) + k(2n + k + 2) > 0;
which is the (HETERO-2) condition stated in Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Values of n
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 k ¸ 8
n ; ; 2 5 10 21 56 1
Calculating the roots of the left-hand side of (HETERO-2) with respect to ®H
®L
, one
obtains two solutions µ
®H
®L
¶
1
<
k(3n + k + 1)¡ p½
2n(k + 1)
;µ
®H
®L
¶
2
>
k(3n + k + 1) +
p
½
2n(k + 1)
;
where ½ ´ n2k(k ¡ 8) + 2nk(k2 ¡ 3k ¡ 4) + k2(k2 + 2k + 1). For those solutions
being real ½ has to be non-negative. Obviously, ½ can only be negative if k < 8.
Table 1 gives the maximum value of type-H ¯rms, n, for all values of k, such that
½ is non-negative.
From the table we observe that, e.g., for k = 3 the maximum number of type-H
¯rms is 2, in order to get a real solution. Hence, for k = 3 and n = 2 there exists
a parameter verctor ! 2 R4 such that the wage revenue function is increasing
for all w 2 [0; w0[. The wage revenue function, WN , always reaches its maximum
at a wage below w0, if no real solution to (HETERO-2) exists, since in this case
(HETERO-2) is always satis¯ed. As can be seen from Table 1, this situation might
only occur if k · 7.
Proof of Lemma 4
Since, k+2
k+1
< k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n , for k; n > 0, (HETERO-3) and (HETERO-4) are satis¯ed
if and only if k+2
k+1
< ®H
®L
< k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n . The condition n > k + 1 assures that
n+1
n
< k+2
k+1
, so that (HETERO-1) is never binding. Finally, we have to show that
for all ®H
®L
2]k+2
k+1
; k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n [ (HETERO-2) is also satis¯ed. For this purpose let us
de¯ne the left-hand side of (HETERO-2) by
G ´ ®
2
H
®2L
n(k + 1)¡ ®H
®L
k(3n+ k + 1) + k(2n+ k + 2):
This is a U-shaped function in ®H
®L
. Therefore, in order for (HETERO-2) to be
ful¯lled it su±ces to show that three conditions are met: (i) G is positive at
®H
®L
= k+2
k+1
, (ii) G is positive at ®H
®L
= k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n , and (iii) the unique minimum of
G with respect to ®H
®L
lies to the right of k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n .
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Part (i). By substituting k+2
k+1
into G we obtain 4n
k+1
> 0.
Part (ii). Substituting k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n into G gives 2kn
k2+n2+2nk+k+n
(k2+nk+k¡n)2 > 0.
Part (iii). Taking the derivative of G with respect to ®H
®L
and setting it equal to
zero gives ®H
®L
= k
2+3nk+k
2nk+2n
. This value is strictly larger than k
2+nk+2k
k2+nk+k¡n if and only
if
n2(k ¡ 5) + n(2k2 ¡ 3k ¡ 5) + k3 + 2k2 + k > 0;
which holds for k ¸ 5. This establishes Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
References
Aghion, P., Blanchard, O., Burgess, R. (1994): The Behaviour of State
Firms in Eastern Europe `Pre-Privatisation', in: European Economic Re-
view, 38, 1327-1349
Akerlof, G.A., Rose, A.K., Yellen, J.L., Hessenius, H. (1991): East Ger-
many in From the Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union, in:
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1-87
Ashenfelter, O., Layard, R. (eds.) (1986): Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. 1 and 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam
Bean, C.R. (1994): European Unemployment: A Survey, in: Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 32, 573-619
Berghahn, V.R., Karsten, D. (1987): Industrial Relations in West Germany,
German Studies Series, Oxford, New York and Hamburg, Berg
Bunn, R.F. (1984): Employers Association in the Federal Republic of Germany,
pp. 169-201 in: J.P. Windmuller and A. Gladstone (eds.), Employers Asso-
ciations and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study, Oxford University
Press, Clarendon Press, New York, Toronto and Oxford
Calmfors, L., Dri±ll, J. (1988): Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Ma-
croeconomic Policy, in: Economic Policy, 6, 13-47
Clasen, L. (1988): Neues AVE - Verzeichnis, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt, 2=1988,
26-29
39
DÄaubler, W., Hege, H. (1981): Tarifvertragsrecht, 2nd edition, Nomos Ver-
lag, Baden-Baden
Deregulierungskommission (1991): MarktÄo®nung und Wettbewerb, PÄoschel,
Stuttgart
Dornbusch, R. (1991): Comments and Discussion on `East Germany in From
the Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union' by G.A. Akerlof et
al., in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 88-105
Dornbusch, R. (1992): Economic Transition in Eastern Germany, in: Broo-
kings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 235-272
Erdmann, G. (1966): Die deutschen ArbeitgeberverbÄande im sozialgeschichtli-
chen Wandel der Zeit, Luchterhand, Neuwied
Franz, W. (1991): German Labour Markets After Uni¯cation, Unpublished Pa-
per, University of Konstanz (October)
Franz, W. (1996): ArbeitsmarktÄokonomik, 3rd edition, Springer, Berlin
Freeman, R. (1988): Labour Markets, in: Economic Policy, 6, 63-78
Gesamtmetall (1993): UnterstÄutzungsfonds und Gefahrengemeinschaft der Me-
tallindustrie, Informationsblatt des Gesamtverbands der metallindustriellen
ArbeitgeberverbÄande e.V., Gesamtmetall, KÄoln
Halbach, G., Paland, N., Schwedes, R., Wlotzke, O. (1991): ÄUbersicht
Äuber das Recht der Arbeit, Bundesminister fÄur Arbeit und Sozialordnung,
Bonn
Haucap, J., Pauly, U., Wey, C. (1999): Bilateral Wage Bargaining When
Wages are Generally Binding: An Antitrust Perspective, Mimeo., Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin fÄur Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Hegemeier, C. (1990): Tarifvertragsgesetz: Kommentar fÄur die Praxis, 2nd
edition, Bund-Verlag, KÄoln
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (1997): Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Ent-
wicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Deutscher Institutsverlag, KÄoln
Jackman, R., Pissarides, C., Savouri, S. (1990): Labour Market Policies
and Unemployment in the OECD, in: Economic Policy, 11, 449-483
40
Johnson, G.E., Layard, P.R.G. (1986): The Natural Rate of Unemployment:
Explanation and Policy, pp. 921-999 in: O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam
Katz, L.F. (1991): Comments and Discussion on `East Germany in From the
Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union' by G.A. Akerlof et al.,
in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-87
Keller, B. (1997): EinfÄuhrung in die Arbeitspolitik, 5th edition, Oldenbourg,
MÄunchen
Krattenmaker, T.G., Salop, S.C. (1986): Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rai-
sing Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, in: Yale Law Journal, 96,
209-293
Kreimer-de Fries (1995): Die AllgemeinverbindlichkeitserklÄarung von Tarif-
vertrÄagen, pp. 203-229 in: R. Bispick (ed.), Tarifpolitik der Zukunft, VSA-
Verlag, Hamburg
Layard, R., Nickell, S., Jackman, R. (1991): Unemployment, Macroecono-
mic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lindbeck, A. (1997): Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, in:
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 87, 370-377
Lindbeck, A., Snower, D.J. (1988): Cooperation, Harassment, and Involun-
tary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach, in: American Econo-
mic Review, 78, 167-188
Lindena, B., HÄohmann, H. (1988a): Viel Diskussion mit wenig Sachverstand,
in: Der Arbeitgeber, 40, 465-467
Lindena, B., HÄohmann, H. (1988b): Weniger allgemein als gemeinhin ange-
nommen, in: Der Arbeitgeber, 40, 564-566
Lindena, B., HÄohmann, H. (1989): Allgemeinverbindlichkeit von Tarifver-
trÄagen, in: Der Arbeitgeber, Special Issue (March), 3-9
LÄowisch, M., Rieble, V. (1992): Tarifvertragsgesetz: Kommentar, Vahlen,
MÄunchen
Maloney, M.T., McCormick, R.E. (1982): A Positive Theory of Environ-
mental Quality Regulation, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 99-123
41
Maloney, M.T., McCormick, R.E., Tollison, R.D. (1979): Achieving Car-
tel Pro¯ts Through Unionization, in: Southern Economic Journal, 42, 628-
634
McDonald, I.M., Solow, R.M. (1981): Wage Bargaining and Employment,
in: American Economic Review, 71, 896-908
Meyer, D. (1992): Zur Bedeutung von AllgemeinverbindlichkeitserklÄarungen,
in: Jahrbuch fÄur Sozialwissenschaft, 43, 364-374
Michaelis, P. (1994): Regulate us, Please! On Strategic Lobbying in Cournot-
Nash Oligopoly, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
150, 693-709
Molitor, C. (1997): Lohn°exibilitÄat auf regionalen ArbeitsmÄarkten in Deutsch-
land und Europa, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main
Monopolkommission (1994): Zehntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommis-
sion 1992/1993, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache
12/8323, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn
Neumann, L.F. et al. (1991): Ein deutsches Mezzogiorno?, pp. 184-207 in:
U. Jens (ed.), Der Umbau, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden
Nickell, S. (1997): Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus
North America, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 55-74
Nickell, S., Andrews, M. (1983): Unions, Real Wages and Employment in
Britain 1951-79, in: Oxford Economics Papers, 35 (Supplement), 183-206
OECD (1994): Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris
Paqu¶e, K.-H. (1991): Structural Wage Rigidity in West Germany 1950-1989:
Some New Econometric Evidence, in: Kiel Working Paper No. 489, Institut
fÄur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel
Petrakis, E., Vlassis, M. (1997): Endogenous Wage-Bargaining Institutions
in Oligopolistic Industries, Working Paper, Universidad Carlos III de Ma-
drid, Madrid
Richter, R. (1997): Warum Arbeitslosigkeit? Antworten von Wirtschafts-
theoretikern seit Keynes (1936), Mimeo., UniversitÄat des Saarlandes,
SaarbrÄucken
42
Ring, G. (1994): Die Allgemeinverbindlichkeit von TarifvertrÄagen, in: Betrieb
und Wirtschaft, 48, 354-358
Romer, D. (1996): Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill, New York
SachverstÄandigenrat (1995): Jahresgutachten 1995/96 des SachverstÄandigen-
rates zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Bundes-
tagsdrucksache 13/3016, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn
Saint-Paul, G. (1996a): Labour Market Institutions and Cohesion of the
Middle Class, in: International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 385-395
Saint-Paul, G. (1996b): Exploring the Political Economy of Labour Market
Institutions, in: Economic Policy, 23, 265-300
Salop, S.C., Sche®man, D.T. (1983): Raising Rivals' Costs, in: American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 73, 267-271
Salop, S.C., Sche®man, D.T. (1987): Cost-Raising Strategies, in: Journal of
Industrial Economics, 36, 19-34
Scheremet, W. (1992): Der Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland, in: Wochenbericht
5-6/92, (Deutsches Institut fÄur Wirtschaftsforschung January 30)
Scheremet, W., Schupp, J. (1992): Pendler und Migranten -Zur Arbeits-
krÄaftemobilitÄat in Ostdeutschland, in: Wochenbericht 3/92, (Deutsches In-
stitut fÄur Wirtschaftsforschung January 17)
Selten, R. (1965): Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit
NachfragetrÄagheit, in: Zeitschrift fÄur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121,
301-324
Selten, R. (1975): Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium
Points in Extensive Games, in: International Journal of Game Theory, 4,
25-55
Sinn, G., Sinn, H.-W. (1992): Jumpstart: The Economic Uni¯cation of Ger-
many, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
von Hagen, J. (1992): German Uni¯cation: Economic Problems and Conse-
quences, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 36, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 211-222
43
von Furstenberg, G.M. (1995): Oversta±ng as an Endgame and Prelude to
the Employment Collapse in Eastern Germany?, in: Communist Economies
and Economic Transformation, 7, 299-318
Williamson, O.E. (1963): Selling Expenses as a Barrier to Entry, in: Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 77, 112-128
Williamson, O.E. (1968): Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 85-116
44
Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung
Books of the Research Area Market Processes and Corporate Development
(nur im Buchhandel erhältlich/available through bookstores)
Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars
Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller,
Leonard Waverman
Europes Network Industries: Conflicting
Priorities - Telecommunications
Monitoring European Deregulation 1
1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research
Manfred Fleischer
The Inefficiency Trap
Strategy Failure in the
German Machine Tool Industry
1997, edition sigma
Christian Göseke
Information Gathering and Dissemination
The Contribution of JETRO to
Japanese Competitiveness
1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag
Andreas Schmidt
Flugzeughersteller zwischen globalem
Wettbewerb und internationaler Kooperation
Der Einfluß von Organisationsstrukturen auf
die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von
Hochtechnologie-Unternehmen
1997, edition sigma
Horst Albach, Jim Y. Jin, Christoph Schenk (eds.)
Collusion through Information Sharing?
New Trends in Competition Policy
1996, edition sigma
Stefan O. Georg
Die Leistungsfähigkeit japanischer Banken
Eine Strukturanalyse des Bankensystems in
Japan
1996, edition sigma
Stephanie Rosenkranz
Cooperation for Product Innovation
1996, edition sigma
Horst Albach, Stephanie Rosenkranz (eds.)
Intellectual Property Rights and Global
Competition - Towards a New Synthesis
1995, edition sigma.
David B. Audretsch
Innovation and Industry Evolution
1995, The MIT Press.
Julie Ann Elston
US Tax Reform and Investment: Reality and
Rhetoric in the 1980s
1995, Avebury
Horst Albach
The Transformation of Firms and Markets:
A Network Approach to Economic
Transformation Processes in East Germany
Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae
Negotiorum, Vol. 34
1994, Almqvist & Wiksell International
(Stockholm).
Horst Albach
"Culture and Technical Innovation: A Cross-
Cultural Analysis and Policy
Recommendations"
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Hg.)
Forschungsbericht 9, S. 1-597
1994, Walter de Gruyter.
Horst Albach
Zerissene Netze. Eine Netzwerkanalyse des
ostdeutschen Transformationsprozesses
1993, edition sigma.
Zoltan J. Acs/David B. Audretsch (eds)
Small Firms and Entrepreneurship: An East-
West Perspective
1993, Cambridge University Press.
Anette Boom
Nationale Regulierungen bei internationalen
Pharma-Unternehmen: Eine theoretische
Analyse der Marktwirkungen
1993, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
David B. Audretsch/John J. Siegfried (eds),
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization
1992, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zoltan J. Acs/David B. Audretsch
Innovation durch kleine Unternehmen
1992, edition sigma.
Hanfried H. Andersen, Klaus-Dirk Henke,
J.-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg (Hrsg.)
Basiswissen Gesundheitsökonomie, Band 1:
Einführende Texte
1992, edition sigma.
Hanfried H. Andersen, Klaus-Dirk Henke,
J.-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg unter Mitarbeit
von Georg B. Kaiser
Basiswissen Gesundheitsökonomie, Band 2:
Kommentierte Bibliographie
1992, edition sigma.
DISCUSSION PAPERS 1997
Rabah Amir R&D Rivalry and Cooperation under FS IV 97 - 1
John Wooders One-Way Spillovers
Frank Verboven Testing for Monopoly Power when Products FS IV 97 - 2
are Differentiated in Quality
Frank Verboven Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation FS IV 97 - 3
and Collusive Behavior
Jim Y. Jin Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Revisited FS IV 97 - 4
Reinhard Koman Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth: FS IV 97 - 5
Dalia Marin Austria and Germany 1960-1992
Lars-Hendrik Röller Why Firms Form Research Joint Ventures: FS IV 97 - 6
Mihkel M. Tombak Theory and Evidence
Ralph Siebert
Rabah Amir Cooperation vs. Competition in R&D: FS IV 97 - 7
John Wooders The Role of Stability of Equilibrium
Horst Albach Learning by Doing, Spillover and Shakeout in FS IV 97 - 8
Jim Jin Monopolistic Competition
Dietmar Harhoff Innovationsanreize in einem strukturellen FS IV 97 - 9
Oligopolmodell
Catherine Matraves Die deutsche Industriestruktur im internationalen FS IV 97 - 10
Vergleich
Yair Tauman A Model of Multiproduct Price Competition FS IV 97 - 11
Amparo Urbano
Junichi Watanabe
Dalia Marin The Economic Institution of International FS IV 97 - 12
Monika Schnitzer Barter
William Novshek Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives FS IV 97 - 13
Lynda Thoman for Information Sharing
Horst Albach Wirtschaftspolitische und technologie- FS IV 97 - 14
politische Folgen der Globalisierung
Horst Albach Humankapitaltheorie der Transformation FS IV 97 - 15
Horst Albach Gutenberg und die Zukunft der Betriebs- FS IV 97 - 16
wirtschaftslehre
Horst Albach Risikokapital in Deutschland FS IV 97 - 17
Dieter Köster
Hiroyuki Okamuro Risk Sharing in the Supplier Relationship: New FS IV 97 - 18
Evidence from the Japanese Automotive Industry
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné Career Concerns and the Acquisition FS IV 97 - 19
Olivier Cadot of Firm-Specific Skills
Steven Casper Corporate Governance and Firm Strategy FS IV 97 - 20
Catherine Matraves in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Bruce R. Lyons Industrial Concentration and Market Integration FS IV 97 - 21
Catherine Matraves in the European Union
Peter Moffatt
Petri Lehto Consolidations and the Sequence FS IV 97 - 22
Mihkel M. Tombak of Acquisitions to Monopoly
Vesa Kanniainen Project Monitoring and Banking Competition FS IV 97 - 23
Rune Stenbacka under Adverse Selection
Dalia Marin Economic Incentives and International Trade FS IV 97 - 24
Monika Schnitzer
Ila M. Semenick Alam Long Run Properties of Technical Efficiency FS IV 97 - 25
Robin C. Sickles in the U.S. Airline Industry
Dietmar Harhoff Citation Frequency and the Value FS IV 97 - 26
Francis Narin of Patented Innovation
Frederic M. Scherer
Katrin Vopel
Dietmar Harhoff Exploring the Tail of Patented FS IV 97 - 27
Frederic M. Scherer Invention Value Distributions
Katrin Vopel
Jim Jin The Effect of Public Information on FS IV 97 - 28
Michael Tröge Competition and R&D Investment
Daniel A. Traca Import-Competition, Market Power FS IV 97 - 29
and Productivity Change
Michael Tröge Banking Competition as Mixed Common and FS IV 97 - 30
Private Value Auction
Lars-Hendrik Röller Capacity and Product Market Competition: FS IV 97 - 31
Robin C.Sickles Measuring Market Power in a "Puppy-Dog" Industry
Talat Mahmood Survival of Newly Founded Businesses: FS IV 97 - 32
A Log-Logistic Model Approach
Silke Neubauer Interdivisional Information Sharing - The Strategic FS IV 97 - 33
Advantage of Knowing Nothing
Silke Neubauer The Consequences of Endogenous Timing for FS IV 97 - 34
Diversification Strategies of Multimarket Firms
Christoph Schenk Capacity Decisions and Subcontracting FS IV 97 - 35
Michael Tröge Industry Ownership of Banks and Credit FS IV 97 - 36
Market Competition
Petra Korndörfer The Link Between Interest Rates on Interbank Money FS IV 97 - 37
and for Credit Lines: Are Asymmetric Interest Rate
Adjustments Empirically Evident?
Damien J. Neven Union Power and Product Market Competition: FS IV 97 - 38
Lars-Hendrik Röller Evidence from the Airline Industry
Zhentang Zhang
Horst Albach Dokumentation der Kaisha-Datenbank - Zur FS IV 97 - 39
Ulrike Görtzen Datenbank der Jahresabschlüsse japanischer
Tobias Miarka Industrieaktiengesellschaften 1970-1997
Andreas Moerke
Thomas Westphal
Rita Zobel
Tobias Miarka New Directions in Japanese Bank-Firm-Relationships: FS IV 97 - 40
Jianping Yang Does a Relationship Matter for Corporate Performance?
Ulrike Görtzen R&D Activities and Technical Information Flow FS IV 97 - 41
in Japanese Electronic Corporations
Andreas Moerke Japanische Unternehmensgruppen - eine FS IV 97 - 42
empirische Analyse
Andreas Moerke Does Governance Matter? Performance and FS IV 97 - 43
Corporate Governance Structures of Japanese
keiretsu Groups
Rita Zobel Employee-Transfer as an Instrument of Information- FS IV 97 - 44
Transfer through Vertical Relations?
Dietmar Harhoff Are there Financing Constraints for R&D and FS IV 97 - 45
Investment in German Manufacturing Firms?
Lutz Bellmann Zur Analyse von Gründungen und Schließungen FS IV 97 - 46
Dietmar Harhoff auf Grundlage der Beschäftigtenstatistik
Norbert Schulz
Andreas Stephan The Impact of Road Infrastructure on Productivity FS IV 97 - 47
and Growth: Some Preliminary Results for the
German Manufacturing Sector
Jim Y. Jin Incentives and Welfare Effect of Sharing FS IV 97 - 48
Firm-Specific Information
Jim Y. Jin Information Sharing about a Demand Shock FS IV 97 - 49
DISCUSSION PAPERS 1998
Horst Albach Unternehmensgründungen in Deutschland FS IV 98 - 1
Potentiale und Lücken
Dietmar Harhoff Vertical Organization, Technology Flows and R&D FS IV 98 - 2
Incentives - An Exploratory Analysis
Karel Cool Der Einfluß des tatsächlichen und des potentiellen FS IV 98 - 3
Lars-Hendrik Röller Wettbewerbs auf die Rentabilität von Unternehmen
Benoit Leleux der pharmazeutischen Industrie
Horst Albach Blühende Landschaften? FS IV 98 - 4
Ein Beitrag zur Transformationsforschung
Shiho Futagami Shukko in Japanese Companies and its Economic FS IV 98 - 5
Tomoki Waragai and Managerial Effects
Thomas Westphal
Dietmar Harhoff Lending Relationships in Germany: Empricial FS IV 98 - 6
Timm Körting Results from Survey Data
Johan Lagerlöf Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know FS IV 98 - 7
How the Economy Works?
Justus Haucap Location Costs, Product Quality, and Implicit FS IV 98 - 8
Christian Wey Franchise Contracts
Jens Barmbold
Manfred Fleischer Patenting and Industrial Performance: The Case FS IV 98 - 9
of the Machine Tool Industry
Dieter Köster Was sind Netzprodukte? - Eigenschaften, FS IV 98 - 10
Definition und Systematisierung von Netzprodukten
Andreas Blume Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language FS IV 98 - 11
Andreas Blume An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning FS IV 98 - 12
Uri Gneezy in Coordination Games
Andreas Blume Learning in Sender-Receiver Games FS IV 98 - 13
Douglas V. DeJong
George R. Neumann
Nathan E. Savin
Hans Mewis The Stability of Information Cascades: How Herd FS IV 98 - 14
Behavior Breaks Down
Lars-Hendrik Röller The Incentives to Form Research Joint Ventures: FS IV 98 - 15
Mihkel M. Tombak Theory and Evidence
Ralph Siebert
Christine Zulehner Econometric Analysis of Cattle Auctions FS IV 98 - 16
DISCUSSION PAPERS 1999
Suchan Chae Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: FS IV 99 - 1
Paul Heidhues Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators
Christian Wey Compatibility Investments in Duopoly with Demand FS IV 99 - 2
Side Spillovers under Different Degrees of Cooperation
Horst Albach Des paysages florissants? Une contribution FS IV 99 - 3
à la recherche sur la transformation
Jeremy Lever The Development of British Competition Law: FS IV 99  4
A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization
 
Absender/From:
Versandstelle - WZB
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785  Berlin
BESTELLSCHEIN / ORDERFORM Bitte schicken Sie bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers
unbedingt eine 1-DM-Briefmarke pro paper und einen an
Sie adressierten Aufkleber mit.   Danke.
Bitte schicken Sie mir aus der Liste der
Institutsveröffentlichungen folgende Papiere zu:
For each paper you order please send a "Coupon-
Réponse International" (international money order)
plus a self-addressed adhesive label.   Thank You.
Please send me the following papers from your Publication List:
Paper Nr./No. Autor/Author + Kurztitel/Short Title
